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of the negotiating agents is spread throughout time until all out-
standingdeliveries/paymentsare closed(attime152).(Delivery
times with the negotiating agents cover a wider range than their
fixed price counterpart because this issue is negotiable). As can
beseen,resourceusagedecreaseswithtimebecausethenumber
ofopennegotiationsdecreaseasagreementsarereached.There-
fore there is a steady decline as deals are finalised and items are
delivered or paid for.
Incomparingtheoperationalcostsofnegotiatingandnonnego-
tiating agents, it is evident that negotiation is more costly. For
this implementation, comparing the processing cost of agent, in
total (i.e., including all other costs associated with the running
agent) yields the following: a negotiating agent uses 4.96 times
more resources than its fixed price counter-part. If the base op-
erating cost of the agent (i.e., without resource costs related to
other agent functionality) is removed from this calculation, ne-
gotiation is 14.8 times more costly than the fixed-price method.
Thisvalueishighbecausenegotiatingagentsretainstateinforma-
tion that is necessary to enact their strategies (fixed price retains
negligiblestateinformation).Thisincludesinformationaboutthe
exchangedvaluesduringanegotiation(forpurposesofexamining
concessionrates,obtainingfeedbackforadaptation,etc.)aswell
as reasoning processes for ensuring coherence with the negotia-
tion protocol. It is critical to be mindful that these specific oper-
atingfigurescannotbeassumedtoholdbeyondthecontextofthe
software used for this simulation. Although we believe that the
broad trend is generic.
However, these results do not lead us to conclude that nego-
tiation is bad. First negotiations allow the agents to change the
set of issues so as to fall within the acceptable region of both
parties. This flexibility is lost in fixed price trading since most
of the time the agents do not know their opponents’ preferences
and utilities which often leads to rejections. Such rejections are
adrainonthesystem’sresources.Inournegotiations,theagents
perform inferences so as to store the state, the history of a nego-
tiation, and the information about their opponents, the environ-
ment and how they themselves adapted to a resource-bounded
environment. Thus, the agents accumulate experience. This ex-
perience is especially useful when using our experience-aware
strategies since they allow adaptation to specific m-commerce
environments. For example, knowing its opponent preferences
and rates of concessions, an agent no longer needs to make an
overly large concession if its deadline is very close. Rather, it
only needs to make a concession that is just enough to obtain a
deal. Also for agents initiating a negotiation, where these agents
have a close deadline or their underlying connection limits their
communication capability, then knowing what is likely to be a
successful deal is crucial.
Second, although extra facilities and costs are required to
support the strategies presented in this paper, (when compared
to the costs for not negotiating), these facilities are likely to
be required by other functional aspects of intelligent agents.
Thus, much of the additional cost of negotiating using our
strategies may be shared with other adaptive mechanisms in
agents. For example, Fig. 11 shows a buyer agent’s experi-
ence of negotiating with two suppliers. It portrays the final
value of each deal ( ) against the number of message
exchanges required versus the initial distance between the first
Fig. 11. Successful past negotiations.
issue/value set exchanged between the customer and supplier
( ). As can be seen, supplier 2 requires
longer exchanges than supplier 1 and also results in a lower
quality deal. Intuitively, it would be sensible for the customer
to approach supplier 1 instead of 2. Yet, this does not take into
accountotheroperationalfactorsthatareimportantforagentsin
mobiledomains.Forexample,thecostofcommunication(time,
financial cost, etc) may differ according to the recipient and
the agent’s local context. Secondly, the need for predictability
may be paramount. Thus, it may be necessary for an agent to
be able to plan more effectively by reasoning more accurately
about future expected resource costs. This would allow (and is
required for) agents to actively manage risk [24]. (A risk averse
agent may nevertheless choose to select supplier 2 because the
region defining the costs associated with negotiating is less
spread out than for supplier 1.Therefore it may be more certain
about the costs it will incur during negotiation.) The agent may
therefore trade utility for predictability thereby allowing it to
plan its future resource commitments more effectively.
A third advantage of negotiation in this context relates to
the time taken for fixed price exchanges versus negotiation. In
the example above, the fixed price mechanism is assumed to
occur as far in advance of delivery time as possible. In this sit-
uation the customer and supplier agents must incur additional
processing costs where nonpayment or nondelivery is possible.
Because there is no contact between the customer and supplier
between the time when a deal is reached and the delivery/pay-
ment time, there is an increasing degree of uncertainty present
if the agent is operating in a domain where failure to deliver is
an acceptable reality. At the other extreme, an agent that under-
goescommodity/serviceacquisitionjust-in-timerunstheriskof
not reaching a deal in time. In contrast, the negotiating agent is
in contact with the dialogue partner for a manipulable period
(by managing time-outs and increasing negotiation time length
by modifying concession rates). When combined with levels of
commitment associated with different speech-acts of the pro-
tocol[24],bothagentsareable tomanageuncertaintybyhaving
recently been in contact and also being able to infer information
about the commitment to a deal of the negotiation partner.
In summary, this simulation evaluates the various costs of
negotiation and compares them with a fixed price offer-agree
interaction. We place our evaluation in the context of the ex-
perience strategy. Using such a strategy, an agent can adapt to
a change of resources or limited resources as is frequently the
case in m-commerce.Our model ensuresan agent does not need
to concede more than it should if it is running out of resources.